One Nation One Election: Reform Trapped in Delay

Introduction

The debate over One Nation One Election has returned to Parliament, but not through the passage of a historic constitutional amendment. Instead, it has returned through another extension granted to the Joint Parliamentary Committee examining the proposal.

The Lok Sabha has extended the tenure of the 41 member committee until the first day of the final week of the Winter Session of 2026. This gives the panel more time to examine the Constitution Amendment Bill and the related changes required to synchronise elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies.

At first glance, an extension may appear to be a routine parliamentary decision. Constitutional amendments require careful scrutiny, consultations, expert testimony, and political consensus. A proposal that could reshape the entire electoral calendar of India should not be rushed.

However, repeated extensions are not politically neutral. Every additional delay sends a message about the level of agreement within Parliament, the complexity of the constitutional questions involved, and the government’s ability to secure the numbers required to pass the reform.

The real story is no longer only whether One Nation One Election is desirable. It is whether such a reform can survive the constitutional, political, and federal realities of Indian democracy.

Why the Latest Extension Matters

A Joint Parliamentary Committee is created to examine legislation in greater detail than is usually possible during a debate on the floor of Parliament. It can hear experts, consult political parties, question government departments, study constitutional implications, and recommend changes.

Extending the committee’s tenure may therefore improve the quality of deliberation.

Yet timing matters.

The extension came during the Monsoon Session, when the government does not independently possess the special majority required to pass a constitutional amendment of this scale. Even if the committee had submitted its report during the session, the legislation could not have been passed without support from parties outside the ruling alliance.

This means the extension performs two functions.

Formally, it gives the committee more time.

Politically, it postpones a parliamentary test that the government may not yet be ready to face.

A constitutional amendment must be approved in each House by a majority of the total membership and by at least two thirds of the members present and voting. Depending on the final design, some provisions may also require ratification by at least half of the State Legislatures.

One Nation One Election therefore cannot be implemented through a simple majority or an executive notification. It requires a broad political coalition.

The repeated extension indicates that such a coalition has not yet fully emerged.

The Idea Behind One Nation One Election

One Nation One Election seeks to align elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies so that they are held together within a common electoral cycle.

India followed a broadly simultaneous election schedule during the first decades after Independence. Elections to the Lok Sabha and most State Assemblies were conducted together in 1951, 1957, 1962, and 1967.

This cycle was disrupted when some State Assemblies were dissolved before completing their terms. The early dissolution of the Lok Sabha further separated national and state election schedules.

Since then, elections have taken place at different times across the country.

Supporters of simultaneous elections argue that frequent polls impose substantial administrative and economic costs. Election officials, security personnel, teachers, and civil servants are repeatedly diverted for election duties.

The Model Code of Conduct can affect the announcement of new policies in states or regions where elections are underway. Political parties remain in continuous campaign mode, while governance can become increasingly shaped by short term electoral calculations.

Supporters also argue that holding elections together may reduce public expenditure, improve administrative continuity, and allow governments to focus on policymaking for longer periods.

These arguments are significant, but they do not resolve the constitutional difficulties.

The Constitutional Architecture of Electoral Terms

The Indian Constitution establishes separate political terms for Parliament and State Legislatures.

Article 83 provides that the Lok Sabha shall continue for five years from the date of its first meeting unless it is dissolved earlier.

Article 172 establishes a similar five year term for State Legislative Assemblies unless they are dissolved earlier.

The phrase “unless sooner dissolved” is central to the debate.

India follows a parliamentary system in which the government must retain the confidence of the elected House. If a government loses its majority and no alternative government can be formed, the House may be dissolved before completing its full term.

Simultaneous elections require these separate constitutional clocks to be brought into alignment.

This may require shortening the term of some Assemblies, extending others, or providing that an Assembly elected after an early dissolution serves only for the remaining part of a common national cycle.

Each option creates democratic concerns.

Shortening an Assembly’s term limits the mandate granted by voters.

Extending its term allows representatives to remain in office beyond the period for which they were elected.

Restricting a newly elected Assembly to a partial term could mean voters return to the polls after only a short interval.

The challenge is therefore not simply to organise elections on the same day. It is to redesign the relationship between electoral mandates and legislative terms.

Articles 85 and 174 and the Power of Dissolution

Article 85 deals with the summoning, prorogation, and dissolution of Parliament.

Article 174 contains similar provisions for State Legislatures.

These Articles allow constitutional authorities to summon the Houses and, in accordance with the parliamentary system, dissolve the Lok Sabha or a State Legislative Assembly.

One Nation One Election raises a difficult question about this power.

What happens when a government loses its majority halfway through the common electoral cycle?

Under the present system, an alternative government may be formed if another leader can demonstrate majority support. If no government can be formed, the House may be dissolved and fresh elections may be held.

Under a simultaneous election framework, holding a fresh election for a full five year term would break the common cycle again.

One possible solution is to conduct an election only for the remaining period of the original term. However, this creates the possibility of very short governments and repeated elections within the same state.

Another option is to place the state under an interim arrangement until the next common election. Such a solution would raise serious concerns about democratic representation and federal autonomy.

The proposal must therefore answer a basic constitutional question.

Should electoral synchronisation take priority over the normal functioning of parliamentary responsibility?

The Role of Article 356

Article 356 permits the imposition of President’s Rule when the constitutional machinery of a state fails.

It has historically played a controversial role in Centre and state relations. Although judicial scrutiny has limited its arbitrary use, it remains an important constitutional mechanism for managing serious state level crises.

One Nation One Election complicates the use of Article 356.

Suppose a State Government collapses and no alternative majority can be formed. Under the existing framework, elections may be conducted when conditions permit.

Under a synchronised framework, the state’s electoral calendar would need to remain connected to the national cycle.

This could create pressure to continue President’s Rule until the next scheduled simultaneous election. Such an approach may leave a state without an elected government for an extended period.

Alternatively, an election could be held immediately, but the newly elected Assembly might receive only the remaining portion of the common term.

Both options have consequences.

Extended central rule may weaken federal democracy.

A shortened Assembly term may weaken the value of the state’s electoral mandate.

The constitutional sequencing problem becomes especially difficult because political crises cannot be scheduled in advance. Coalitions collapse, governments lose confidence votes, emergencies arise, and regional political alignments change.

A national election calendar can be planned. Political instability cannot.

The Law Commission’s 2018 Position

The Law Commission’s 2018 draft report recognised the administrative appeal of simultaneous elections but also accepted that they could not be implemented within the existing constitutional framework.

It identified the need for amendments to the Constitution, electoral laws, and parliamentary procedures.

The Commission discussed possible mechanisms for restoring synchronisation. These included conducting elections in phases and using measures such as a constructive vote of no confidence.

Under a constructive vote of no confidence, a government can be removed only when the legislature simultaneously agrees on a replacement.

This can reduce instability because opposition parties cannot bring down a government without demonstrating that another government is ready to assume office.

However, importing such a mechanism into India would significantly alter parliamentary practice.

It could improve stability, but it may also make it more difficult to remove a government that has lost political legitimacy but continues to survive because the opposition cannot agree on an alternative leader.

The Law Commission’s analysis demonstrated that simultaneous elections are not merely an electoral reform. They may require a broader redesign of parliamentary government.

The Kovind Committee’s Recommendations

The High Level Committee chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind submitted its report in 2024.

The committee recommended a phased approach.

In the first stage, elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies would be held together.

In the second stage, elections to municipalities and panchayats would be held within a defined period following the national and state elections.

The committee also proposed an appointed date from which the transition towards simultaneous elections could begin.

Under this framework, the terms of State Assemblies elected after the appointed date could be adjusted so that they end with the term of the Lok Sabha.

The recommendations provide a possible legal pathway, but they do not remove the political difficulty.

Aligning terms requires some Assemblies to complete less than five years. Political parties governing those states may resist losing part of their mandate.

The committee also recommended a common electoral roll and coordinated electoral machinery. This introduces another layer of federal concern because local body elections are conducted by State Election Commissions, while parliamentary and Assembly elections are managed by the Election Commission of India.

Administrative efficiency must therefore be balanced with the constitutional distribution of electoral authority.

The Federalism Problem

India is described as a Union of States, but its political system allows states to develop distinct electoral cycles and political priorities.

State elections are not simply smaller versions of national elections. They often focus on regional leadership, local welfare, language, identity, agriculture, public services, and state specific governance.

When national and state elections are held together, national issues may dominate voter attention. Regional parties fear that their campaigns could be overshadowed by national personalities and narratives.

Supporters of simultaneous elections argue that voters are capable of making separate choices for Parliament and State Assemblies. India has several examples where voters selected different parties in elections held close together.

Even so, election timing influences political communication, media coverage, campaign spending, and public attention.

Federalism is not protected only by distributing legislative subjects between the Union and the States. It is also protected by allowing state politics to develop independently.

A reform that places every state within one national political calendar may create a more centralised electoral environment.

This does not automatically make the proposal unconstitutional. It does mean that federal consequences must be examined seriously rather than treated as a minor administrative issue.

Is Continuous Electioneering the Real Problem?

One of the strongest arguments for One Nation One Election is that India remains in a permanent election cycle.

Some state or local election is almost always approaching. Governments and political parties may therefore prioritise visible short term measures over long term reforms.

However, simultaneous elections may not end continuous electioneering.

Political parties will still hold rallies, organise membership campaigns, conduct local outreach, and prepare for future contests. Local body elections, by elections, internal party struggles, and political movements will continue.

The Model Code of Conduct also applies only within the relevant electoral area and period. Its effect on national governance is sometimes overstated.

The better solution may be to reform the Model Code, reduce unnecessary restrictions, improve campaign finance transparency, digitise election management, and strengthen administrative planning.

One Nation One Election may reduce the frequency of large elections, but it cannot remove electoral politics from a democracy.

Democracy Is Not Designed Only for Efficiency

The strongest case for simultaneous elections is based on efficiency.

Fewer election cycles may reduce expenditure, administrative disruption, security deployment, and pressure on public institutions.

However, democracy is not designed solely to minimise costs.

Frequent elections also create repeated opportunities for accountability. They allow citizens in different states to express their views at different moments.

State elections can signal dissatisfaction with national policies. They can strengthen regional opposition, test welfare models, and reveal changes in public opinion between general elections.

A single national election cycle may improve coordination, but it could also concentrate political power and reduce the frequency of democratic correction.

The objective should not be to make democracy as inexpensive as possible. It should be to make democratic accountability effective, fair, and manageable.

Why the JPC Delay May Be Valuable

The committee’s extension can be interpreted as evidence of political weakness. It can also be interpreted as recognition that the proposal requires deeper examination.

A constitutional reform affecting every voter, State Assembly, political party, and level of government should not be passed merely because it has an appealing slogan.

The committee must examine how the system would respond to hung Assemblies, coalition breakdowns, defections, confidence votes, President’s Rule, war, emergency situations, and court ordered elections.

It must also determine whether State Legislatures will be required to ratify the final amendments and how disagreements between the Election Commission of India and State Election Commissions will be resolved.

The delay becomes valuable if it produces clearer safeguards.

It becomes problematic if extensions are used only to avoid a parliamentary defeat or postpone difficult political negotiations.

The quality of the final report will determine whether the delay represents responsible deliberation or legislative uncertainty.

The Political Meaning of Every Extension

Parliamentary extensions often reveal more than official statements.

The government supports One Nation One Election as a transformative reform, yet it must persuade opposition parties and regional forces to support constitutional changes.

Several opposition parties view the proposal as a threat to federalism and regional representation. Others may support limited electoral coordination but oppose the specific legal mechanism proposed by the government.

The ruling alliance must therefore decide whether to negotiate, modify the Bill, or wait for a more favourable parliamentary composition.

Every extension keeps the reform alive without forcing an immediate vote.

This allows the government to retain the political message of supporting One Nation One Election while avoiding the risk of failing to secure the required majority.

The delay is therefore not merely procedural. It is part of the strategy surrounding the reform.

The Way Forward

India needs a more focused debate on simultaneous elections.

First, the government should clearly explain how early dissolution of the Lok Sabha or a State Assembly would be handled.

Second, any proposal to shorten or extend legislative terms must be examined from the perspective of voter consent.

Third, safeguards must prevent the excessive use of President’s Rule merely to preserve the common election cycle.

Fourth, the constitutional role of State Election Commissions must be protected.

Fifth, the financial savings claimed by supporters should be compared with the cost of purchasing additional voting machines, expanding storage, training personnel, and conducting elections across the country within a compressed period.

Sixth, Parliament should consider partial reforms. Elections could be grouped into two broad cycles rather than forced into a single national schedule.

Seventh, reforms to campaign finance, the Model Code of Conduct, and election administration should continue regardless of whether simultaneous elections are adopted.

Finally, the proposal must be built through political consensus rather than numerical manoeuvring.

A reform that aims to unify India’s electoral calendar cannot succeed by deepening distrust between the Union and the States.

Conclusion

One Nation One Election is often presented as a simple choice between efficient governance and endless campaigning.

The constitutional reality is far more complex.

Simultaneous elections require changes to legislative terms, dissolution procedures, confidence mechanisms, emergency provisions, and Centre and state relations.

Articles 83, 85, 172, 174, and 356 were designed for a parliamentary democracy in which governments may rise and fall at different times. Aligning every election within one national cycle requires those constitutional possibilities to be reorganised.

The latest extension granted to the Joint Parliamentary Committee reflects this difficulty.

It may represent responsible caution. It may also reflect the absence of the political majority needed to pass the amendment.

One Nation One Election should therefore not be judged only by the promise of lower costs and fewer campaigns. It must be judged by how it protects democratic mandates, state autonomy, parliamentary accountability, and constitutional flexibility.

The greatest danger is not that the reform takes too long.

The greater danger is that a reform designed to simplify elections ends up simplifying democracy itself.