Can SHANTI Turn India’s UN Seat Into Permanent Power?

Introduction

India has formally launched its campaign for a nonpermanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2028 to 2029 term. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar unveiled the campaign under the acronym SHANTI, which stands for Securing Holistic Advancement through Norms, Trust and Integrity.

The choice of SHANTI, the Indian word for peace, gives the campaign a clear diplomatic message. India wants to present itself as a country that can connect security with development, technology, humanitarian responsibility and institutional trust. The campaign is built around five areas where India believes it has practical credibility: security, humanitarian assistance, action against terrorism, technology and infrastructure.

If elected, India would begin its ninth term as an elected member of the Security Council. That would strengthen India’s claim that it is not an occasional participant in global governance, but an experienced contributor whose role has repeatedly exceeded its formal status.

However, another elected term cannot be treated as an achievement in itself.

India has served on the Council many times, chaired important committees and contributed extensively to United Nations peacekeeping. Yet the structure of the Council remains largely unchanged. India is still outside the permanent category, negotiations remain trapped in procedural debates and resistance to expansion remains organised.

The real test of SHANTI is therefore not whether India can win the election. The test is whether India can convert a two year term into durable momentum for permanent membership.

Why Another Security Council Term Matters

The Security Council has fifteen members. Five are permanent members with veto power, while ten elected members serve two year terms. The General Assembly elects five new nonpermanent members each year, with attention given to regional distribution and contributions to international peace and security.

India is likely to enter the election with considerable diplomatic support. It is a major economy, a leading contributor to peacekeeping, a prominent voice of the Global South and an increasingly important partner in maritime security, digital governance, development finance and disaster response.

Yet an elected seat has clear limits.

A nonpermanent member can shape debates, propose resolutions, chair committees and influence negotiations. It cannot exercise a veto. It cannot independently change the Council’s structure. It cannot force permanent members to surrender or dilute their privileges.

This means India must use the seat as a coalition building platform rather than merely as a stage for national statements.

Previous tenures strengthened India’s diplomatic visibility. They also allowed India to lead discussions on terrorism, maritime security, peacekeeping and multilateral reform. During its 2021 to 2022 term, India chaired the Counter Terrorism Committee and hosted a special meeting in Mumbai and New Delhi.

However, visibility is not the same as institutional change.

India’s ninth term must be judged by whether it changes the political calculations of countries that remain undecided, cautious or opposed to permanent membership expansion.

SHANTI as a Foreign Policy Framework

The five themes associated with SHANTI are not random campaign promises. They correspond closely with India’s strongest areas of contemporary diplomacy.

Security

India increasingly presents security as a broad concept that includes maritime stability, resilient supply chains, peacekeeping, cyber governance and protection of critical infrastructure.

Its position in the Indian Ocean gives it strategic relevance across important shipping routes. Its defence partnerships extend across the Indo Pacific, West Asia, Africa and Europe. At the same time, India maintains strategic autonomy and avoids formal military alliances.

This allows India to communicate with countries that may not belong to the same political or security bloc.

A Security Council term would give India an opportunity to present itself as a bridge between competing powers rather than as an extension of any one camp.

Humanitarian Assistance

India has developed considerable capacity in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

It has supplied medicines, vaccines, food, rescue teams and emergency support to countries affected by pandemics, earthquakes, cyclones, conflicts and economic crises. Such assistance gives India credibility among developing countries because it is usually presented as demand driven cooperation rather than political conditionality.

Humanitarian diplomacy can become a major part of India’s permanent membership campaign. Many smaller states do not directly shape Security Council reform, but their votes in the General Assembly matter.

India must therefore demonstrate that its permanent membership would expand the influence of developing countries rather than merely elevate India’s own status.

Action Against Terrorism

India has consistently argued that the international response to terrorism is weakened by selective definitions, political protection and delays in sanctioning individuals and organisations.

This remains one of India’s strongest claims to Security Council relevance. Terrorism affects national security, cross border stability, financial systems, digital networks and civilian life.

However, India’s challenge is to move beyond repeated statements calling for a comprehensive convention on international terrorism.

During a future Council term, India should work towards practical agreements on terror financing, misuse of emerging technology, online radicalisation, unmanned systems and accountability for state support.

Measurable outcomes would strengthen India’s argument that it can convert long standing concerns into workable multilateral rules.

Technology

Technology has become central to India’s international identity.

India’s digital public infrastructure, payment systems, identity platforms and technology enabled public services have attracted attention across the developing world. India has also advocated a more inclusive approach to artificial intelligence, data governance and digital capacity building.

Security Council debates increasingly involve cyber threats, artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons, satellite systems and digital disinformation.

India can use SHANTI to argue that a Council designed in 1945 cannot respond effectively to modern security threats without members that understand the scale, risks and developmental possibilities of emerging technology.

Technology diplomacy also offers India a way to connect security reform with the practical needs of the Global South.

Infrastructure

India’s infrastructure diplomacy includes physical connectivity, digital networks, energy systems and development partnerships.

Through bilateral assistance and platforms involving multiple countries, India has supported roads, railways, ports, electricity, housing, public institutions and digital connectivity.

Infrastructure is often treated as an economic matter, but it has direct security implications. Debt distress, unreliable energy systems, damaged transport networks and unequal access to technology can intensify instability.

By placing infrastructure within SHANTI, India is making a broader argument. Sustainable peace requires functioning institutions and economic capacity, not only the absence of war.

The G4 Route to Permanent Membership

India’s most important formal coalition for Security Council reform is the G4, which includes Brazil, Germany, India and Japan.

The four countries support expansion in both permanent and elected categories. Each considers itself a serious candidate for permanent membership and argues that the existing Council does not reflect present economic, demographic and political realities.

The G4 has submitted reform models within the United Nations process and continues to call for text based negotiations rather than endless repetition of national positions.

The strength of the G4 is also its weakness.

Together, the members represent major regions and significant economic power. However, each faces regional opposition. Pakistan resists India’s claim, Italy has historically opposed Germany’s elevation, some Latin American states question Brazil’s representation of the region and several Asian countries remain cautious about Japan.

The G4 must therefore become more than a club of four national aspirants. It needs a wider political compact with Africa, small island states, developing countries and underrepresented regions.

India can play a central role in building that compact because its claim is tied not only to economic size, but also to Global South representation.

The Uniting for Consensus Obstacle

The most organised resistance to new permanent seats comes from the Uniting for Consensus group.

Its members support a larger and more representative Council but generally oppose adding new permanent national seats. They prefer expansion in elected or longer term categories, arguing that additional permanent members would create new privileges rather than make the institution more democratic.

The group includes countries such as Italy, Pakistan, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Mexico, South Korea, Spain and Türkiye. Its position has remained influential because Security Council reform requires broad agreement, not merely support from the largest states.

India cannot overcome this bloc through public criticism alone.

It must engage with the group’s underlying concern. Why should replacing five privileged powers with a larger set of privileged powers be considered democratic reform?

India needs a convincing answer.

One option is to support stronger accountability for new permanent members, including periodic reviews, limits on veto use and formal responsibilities towards regional constituencies.

Another is to accept transitional arrangements in which new permanent members initially enter without immediate veto rights, subject to review after a defined period.

India has traditionally opposed unequal permanent membership. Yet practical diplomacy may require separating the demand for a permanent seat from the demand for an immediate veto.

The Missing Coalition With Africa

No Security Council reform proposal can succeed without strong African support.

Africa has fifty four United Nations members but no permanent representative on the Council. India has repeatedly supported correcting this historical injustice and has welcomed African demands for representation in the permanent category.

This creates an opportunity for SHANTI.

India should build an explicit India Africa reform partnership rather than treating African support as automatic. It can support a defined number of permanent African seats, wider elected representation and a stronger African role in setting the Council’s agenda.

In return, India can seek support for a reform model that recognises its own global role.

Such an agreement would carry more political weight than repeated G4 declarations because it would connect India’s aspiration with the most underrepresented continent in the present system.

The Secretary General Succession Race

The campaign also unfolds during an important transition in United Nations leadership.

The Secretary General is appointed by the General Assembly following a recommendation from the Security Council. In practice, this gives the permanent members considerable influence because a candidate cannot advance through the Council if blocked by a veto holding power.

This process exposes the same institutional imbalance that India seeks to reform.

The next selection provides India with a diplomatic opportunity, but it must be handled carefully. India should advocate a transparent, merit based and geographically inclusive process rather than appearing to trade support for a candidate in exchange for backing on Council reform.

At the same time, candidates seeking broad legitimacy will need to address the credibility crisis affecting the United Nations.

India can use this debate to ask every serious candidate to define a position on Security Council reform, Global South representation, peacekeeping mandates, technology governance and institutional accountability.

The succession race will not deliver permanent membership. It can, however, make reform a central test of leadership rather than a ceremonial paragraph in campaign statements.

Turning a Two Year Seat Into Permanent Momentum

India needs a clear strategy before entering the Council.

First, it should identify a group of countries whose support for permanent membership is uncertain and engage them through specific diplomatic proposals.

Second, India should align the G4 position more closely with African demands. A shared reform document involving the G4 and major African groupings would significantly increase pressure for formal negotiations.

Third, India should seek progress towards a consolidated negotiating text. The present Intergovernmental Negotiations process allows countries to repeat positions without moving towards a final decision. Recent United Nations discussions continue to record both areas of agreement and deep divisions, but a binding negotiation has still not emerged.

Fourth, India should produce visible results during its Council tenure. Leadership on terrorism, peacekeeping reform, maritime security, humanitarian access and emerging technology would demonstrate the practical value of Indian membership.

Fifth, India should avoid presenting permanent membership as a reward for national greatness. The stronger argument is that India’s inclusion would improve the Council’s legitimacy, representation and capacity.

Can the Permanent Five Be Persuaded?

Any amendment to the United Nations Charter requires approval by two thirds of the General Assembly and ratification by two thirds of member states, including all five permanent members.

This gives the permanent members an effective final veto over reform.

India therefore needs more than public endorsements. General expressions of support from major powers are useful, but they do not guarantee ratification of a specific reform proposal.

The central question is what the permanent members gain from expansion.

India must argue that reform is not an attempt to weaken existing powers, but a way to preserve the Council’s relevance. An institution that excludes major economies and entire regions from permanent representation will gradually lose legitimacy and authority.

For the permanent five, limited reform may ultimately be safer than institutional decline.

Conclusion

SHANTI gives India a coherent platform for its campaign for the 2028 to 2029 Security Council term.

Its themes reflect areas where India already possesses diplomatic credibility. Security, humanitarian assistance, action against terrorism, technology and infrastructure allow India to present itself as a practical contributor rather than merely an aspirant seeking status.

But winning a ninth elected term will be the easier part.

The greater challenge is converting temporary membership into permanent political momentum. That requires India to strengthen the G4, engage seriously with Uniting for Consensus, build a formal compact with Africa and use the Secretary General selection debate to place reform at the centre of institutional legitimacy.

India’s previous Council terms proved that it could operate within the system.

The SHANTI campaign must now prove that India can build the coalition required to change it.